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CRIMINAL LAW-EIGHTH CIRCUIT
MISAPPLIES PINKERTON BY HOLDING
CONSPIRACY NEED NOT BE CHARGEDUNITED STATES V. ZA CKER Y, 494 F.3D 644 (8TH

CIR. 2007)
The federal conspiracy statute makes it a crime for two or more
persons to conspire to commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the United States in any way, shape, or form.' Conspiracy itself is a2
separate offense from the substantive crime envisioned by the agreement.
In Pinkerton v. United States,3 the Supreme Court made the landmark ruling that a defendant could be vicariously liable for the substantive crimes
of his coconspirators so long as the substantive offenses were committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy, fell within the scope of the conspiracy, and4
were reasonably foreseeable as the natural consequences of the conspiracy.
In United States v. Zacker,, 5 the Eighth Circuit considered whether a defendant could be convicted of a substantive offense under the Pinkerton
theory of liability if the indictment did not include a charge of conspiracy
.See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). The full statute reads:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United States,
or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum
punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
Id; see also Michael Manning, Comment, A Common Law Crime Analisis of Pinkerton v. United
States: Sixv ' Years fImpermissible Judicially-CreatedCriminal Liabilit,, 67 MONT. L. REV. 89,
104 (2006) (listing elements for conspiracy conviction). Under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government
must prove: -1) an agreement between two or more persons, the object of which is an offense
against the United States or to defraud the United States; 2) the defendant knowingly and willingly joined the conspiracy; and 3) at least one of the co-conspirators committed an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. (citing United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 476 (2d Cir.
2003)).
2 Karen Anderson & Megan Bertron, Federal Criminal Conspiracv, 33 AM. CRtM. L. REV.
729, 729-30 (1996) (explaining conspiracy as separate offense from substantive crime contemplated). The conspiracy charge and the substantive charge are mutually exclusive, as an acquittal
of one charge does not bar a conviction of the other. Id.
3 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
4 Id. at 647-48 (holding overt act of one partner in conspiracy attributable to all involved in
conspiracy).
' 494 F.3d 644 (8th Cir. 2007), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 04, 2007) (No. 07-8034).
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itself.6 The court held that a defendant could be convicted under the
Pinkerton theory even if the indictment did not include a charge of conspir7
acy.
On May 28, 2004, the vice president of TelComm Credit Union,
Steven Butler, arrived at the bank to open the branch for the day.i As Butler attempted to enter the bank through the rear door, two men wearing ski
masks approached him.9 One of the men knocked Butler over, held an object close to his head and stated that he would kill Butler if he did not open
the bank's vault.' 0 Butler later testified that he thought the object near his
head was a pistol.''
Butler obeyed the robbers and opened the bank door by entering a
code into the computerized security system.' 2 Unbeknownst to the robbers,3
Butler also entered a distress code alerting the police to the break-in.'
Upon entering the bank, the man with the pistol said, "I ought to cap you,"
but the other man, later identified as the defendant, Zackery, assured Butler
that he would not be hurt.' 4 The police arrived soon after and both robbers
fled. 15 Officers pursued and arrested Zackery but did not find the other
man or recover the firearm.'1
The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri subsequently indicted Zackery for attempted robbery and possession
of a firearm in furtherance of the robbery.' 7 Zackery pled guilty to the at-

6 Id. at 647 (reviewing appellant's argument that distinct conspiracy offense must be charged
before Pinkerton liability will stand).
7 See id. at 648 (stating "whether the indictment charged separate conspiracy offense is irrelevant.").
Id. at 646 (detailing facts of case).
Id. (describing appearance of bank robbers).
10 494 F.3d at 646 (detailing confrontation between Butler and bank robbers).
I Id. (recounting Butler's testimony at trial). Although the attack dazed Butler. he testified
that he saw the object by his head through his peripheral vision. d. The district court subsequently found that the object was a firearm. d.
12 Id. (outlining facts ofcase).
13 h. (outlining facts of case).
14 MI.(summarizing communications between Butler and bank robbers).
15 494 F.3d at 646 (detailing facts of case).

16 Id. (describing police pursuit).
17 Id. at 645-46 (specifying counts one and two of indictment in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

2113(a) and (d) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c) and (2)). The attempted robbery statute, in relevant part,
provides:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take, from the
person or presence of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by extortion any property or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or in the care, custody. control,
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association; or

2008]

UNITED STA TES V. ZA CKER Y

tempted robbery charge and was later convicted of the firearm possession
after a bench trial."5 While the district court found that Zackery did not actually possess the firearm, it found that it was reasonably foreseeable to
Zackery that his accomplice in the bank robbery would have a weapon."
The district court, therefore, convicted Zackery of the substantive firearm
21
offense committed by his partner under the Pinkerton theory of liability.
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank. credit union, or any savings and loan association, or any building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit union, or as a savings and loan association, with intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in such
savings and loan association, or building, or part thereof, so used, any felony affecting
such bank, credit union, or such savings and loan association and in violation of any
statute of the United States, or any larceny
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000).
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section. assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of any
person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2113(d) (2000).
The firearm possession statute reads:
Except to the extent that a greater minimurn sentence is otherwise provided by this
subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to
any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug
trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of
a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a
court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm. or who, in furtherance of any such
crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime
of violence or drug trafficking crime-(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a tern of imprisonment of not less than
7 years, and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less
than 10 years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)( I)(A) (2000).
The aiding and abetting statute reads:
Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
18 494 F.3d at 645 (chronicling procedural history).
19 Id. at 646 (outlining district court's findings for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).
20 Id. (clarifying Pinkerton theory of liability as basis for district court's ruling). The Eighth
Circuit further explained the district court's holding in light of the Pinkerton theory of liability,
stating, "[I]t was reasonably foreseeable to Zackery that his accomplice would use a firearm in
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Zackery appealed this conviction, arguing that he could not be convicted of
the substantive firearm offense under Pinkerton because the indictment did
not include a charge of conspiracy itself.21 Holding that a defendant could
be convicted under the Pinkerton theory of liability even if conspiracy was
not charged in the indictment, the Eighth Circuit upheld Zackery's conviction.22
In Pinkerton v. United States, the Supreme Court made the landmark ruling that a defendant could be vicariously liable for the substantive
crimes of his coconspirators so long as the substantive offenses were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, fell within the scope of the conspiracy, and were reasonably foreseeable as the natural consequences of the
conspiracy. 23 Invoking principles of agency and partnership, the Court reasoned that by joining an unlawful scheme, a person inherently designated
agents to carry out the performance of the plan. 24 So long as the partner-

furtherance of their conspiracy to commit a violent crime, attempted robbery." Id. The district
court, therefore, inferred a conspiracy to commit the robbery although conspiracy itself was not
charged in the indictment. Id.
21 Id (stating primary issue on appeal). See generalv Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United
States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, No. 06-1930 (8th Cir. Oct. 2006).
22 Id. at 648 (maintaining "whether the indictment charged a separate conspiracy offense is
simply irrelevant.").
23 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946). The defendants, brothers W.
Daniel Pinkerton and Walter G. Pinkerton, were charged with conspiracy to violate the Internal
Revenue Code and other substantive offenses committed in furtherance of violating the Code. Id.
at 641-42. A jury found Walter guilty of the conspiracy charge and nine of the substantive
charges, while it found Daniel guilty of the conspiracy charge and six of the substantive charges.
Id. at 641. Although evidence existed to show that Walter had committed the substantive offenses in furtherance of the conspiracy, no evidence existed to prove that Daniel participated in
any of the substantive offenses that sustained his conviction. Id. at 645. The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found the two defendants were engaged in an unlawful conspiracy, it
could convict each of the defendants on all of the substantive offenses, so long as the offenses
were committed pursuant to the unlawful agreement. Id. The jury subsequently convicted both
brothers. Id. at 641. Daniel Pinkerton, relying on United States v. Sail, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir.
1940), appealed and argued that his participation in the conspiracy alone was not enough to sustain his conviction of the substantive offenses. Id. at 646 see Sail, 116 F.2d at 747 (holding evidence of participation in commission of substantive offenses necessary before conviction of such
offenses will stand). The Pinkerton Court rejected Daniel's argument and overruled Sall.
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646.
24 Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646 (reiterating Court's reasoning). The Court relied on the language of Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912), a case involving a conspiracy to defraud the
United States out of its public lands. Id. While Hyde advanced the principles of agency and partnership in the context of conspiracy, the Court recognized that such relationships would terminate
if a coconspirator did some act to rebuke or defeat the objective of the conspiracy. Id (citing
Hyde, 225 U.S. at 369). The Court concluded that Daniel Pinkerton took no affirmative action to
withdraw from the conspiracy and therefore found him subject to the agency principles articulated
in Hyde. 328 U.S. at 646. But see Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A "New" Due Process
Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy Liability, 33 AM. J. CRiM. L. 91, 96-97 (2006) (analyzing
Pinkerton's agency justifications for coconspirator vicarious liability). Noferi notes, however,
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ship in crime continued, the overt acts of one partner committed in furtherance of the conspiracy were attributable to all partners.2 5 Additionally, the
Court analogized coconspirator liability to accomplice liability, justifying
its holding on causational grounds. 26 According to the Court, each conspirator instigated the commission of substantive offenses simply by joining the conspiracy, as he or she created the context in which the offense
could occur.27 Thus, like accomplices, coconspirators assisted in the commission of the substantive offenses and were therefore
equally as punish28
able as the principal who committed the actual crime.
that agency law generally requires consent among the parties before they may act on behalf of
one another. Id. The Pinkerton rule does not require such consent, as coconspirators may be liable for acts which they did not sanction. Id. The Pinkerton Court likely recognized this distinction; according to Noferi, this distinction may have formed the basis for the Court's requirement
that the substantive offenses be reasonably foreseeable and within the scope of the conspiracy.
Id.
25 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 646-47 (citing United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608
(1910)) (articulating applicability of agency and partnership principles to conspiracy offense).
The Kissel Court, in an opinion by Justice Holmes, analyzed conspiracy as a partnership for
criminal purposes, and stated that "an overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any
new agreement specifically directed to that act." Kissel, 218 U.S. at 608. But see Susan W.
Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. REV. 931, 938 (1991) (noting Justice Holmes "cited no authority" for this statement). According to Brenner, the rationale for the Pinkerton doctrine had to be found elsewhere,
as Kissel did not address the issue ofcoconspirator liability at all. Id.
26 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 (stating, "[t]he rule which holds responsible one who counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime is founded on the same principle."). The
federal accomplice liability statute reads: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States
or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal." 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000). Aiding and abetting is a theory of liability implied in every count;
therefore, it does not have to be expressly charged in an indictment. See United States v. Clark,
980 F.2d 1143, 1146 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Aiding and abetting is an alternative charge in every count,
whether implicit or explicit.").
27 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647 (invoking causation principles). As the Court explained,
"[Elach conspirator instigated the commission of the crime. The unlawful agreement contemplated precisely what was done. It was formed for the purpose. The act was done in execution of
the enterprise." Id.; see also Noferi, supra note 24, at 96 (analyzing causation as possible theoretical justification for Pinkerton doctrine).
28 See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648 (affirming defendant's conviction); see also Neal Kumar
Katyal, Danger in Numbers: Why it Makes Sense to Have Harsh Punishments for Conspiracy,
APR LEGAL AFF. 44, 46 (2003) (defending Pinkerton on public policy grounds). Katyal advances
two primary arguments in favor of the Pinkerton doctrine. First, he argues that Pinkerton provides for effective law enforcement. Id. According to Katyal, "small fish" within a conspiracy
are more inclined to become informants when confronted with the threat of vicarious liability;
therefore, law enforcement officials will be able to elicit key information without resorting to intrusive and coercive techniques. Id. Second, Katyal argues that the Pinkerton doctrine deters
criminals from participating in conspiracies all together, as the risk of liability makes the conspiracy less appealing. Id; see also Matthew A. Pauley, The Pinkerton Doctrine and Murder, 4
PIERCE L. REV. 1, 8 (2005) (arguing Pinkerton is consistent with American jurisprudence). But
see Pinkerton. 328 U.S. at 648-54 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (arguing Pinkerton doctrine dangerous and without precedent). Justice Rutledge criticized the majority for impermissibly fusing to-
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Three years later, in Nye & Nissen v. United States,29 the Supreme
Court clarified the Pinkerton rule by distinguishing coconspirator liability
and accomplice liability as separate theories available to convict individuals of substantive crimes. 3 0 Emphasizing that Pinkerton is narrow in scope,
the Court reiterated that a Pinkerton conviction will stand only if there is a
conspiracy and if there is a reasonable connection between the goals of that
conspiracy and the substantive offenses committed. 3' Aiding and abetting,
however, "rests on a broader base," and makes an accomplice liable as a
principal if he or she encouraged or participated in any criminal act, regardless of whether a conspiracy existed.32 While the Pinkerton doctrine and
accomplice liability differ, the Nye & Nissen Court established that they are
alternate theories of liability which could each be used to convict an indigether three separate crimes: 1) completed substantive offenses; 2) aiding, abetting, or counseling
another to commit the offenses, and 3) conspiracy to commit the offenses. Id. at 649. He argued
that if these distinctions are disregarded, a person may be convicted twice for the same offense
(double jeopardy) or be convicted of one crime based on evidence of another. Id. Additionally,
Justice Rutledge insisted that the Pinkerton doctrine afforded prosecutors too much discretion and
feared the "almost unlimited scope of vicarious responsibility for others' acts which follow once
agreement is shown .... " Id. at 650; see also Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Several Problems in
Criminal Conspiracy Laws and Some Proposals.for Reform, 43 No. 4 CRIM. L. BULLETIN 1, 7
(2007) (criticizing Pinkerton for failing to define scope of conspiracy and for assuming conspiracy will encompass all bad acts committed by coconspirators); Manning, supra note 1, at 90-91
(arguing Pinkerton impermissibly created federal common law crime).
29 336 U.S. 613 (1949).
30 See id. at 618 (finding aiding and abetting an "equally valid theory" as Pinkerton doctrine). The defendant, president of Nye & Nissen Corporation, was indicted for conspiracy to
defraud the United States and for six other counts relating to fraudulent misrepresentation. Id. at
614-15. Although the indictment included a count of conspiracy, the trial judge instructed the
jury on an aiding and abetting theory of liability, rather than a Pinkerton coconspirator theory of
liability. Id. at 618. The defendant was convicted and appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing
that the conviction was in fact based on the Pinkerton theory, and that there was insufficient evidence to prove that his substantive criminal acts were in furtherance of the original conspiracy.
Id. The Court, emphasizing that aiding and abetting was an "equally valid theory," upheld the
defendant's conviction on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that
the defendant aided and abetted in the commission of the substantive offenses. Id. at 619. The
Court further noted that either a Pinkerton or aiding and abetting theory of liability was appropriate in this case, concluding that "[t]he fact that a particular case might conceivably be submitted
to the jury on either theory is irrelevant." Id. at 620.
31 See id at 620 (reiterating Pinkerton's narrow scope). The Court stated, "The rule of
[Pinkerton] does service where the conspiracy was one to commit offenses of the character described in the substantive counts." Id.
32 Id; see also Brenner, supra note 25, at 969-73 (analyzing fundamental differences between
Pinkerton doctrine and accomplice liability). Under Pinkerton, an unlawful agreement is necessary before liability may be imposed. Id. at 969. A person who joins the conspiracy can therefore
be liable for the substantive acts of his coconspirators committed pursuant to the conspiracy even
if that person did not partake in the substantive acts himself. Id. Under accomplice liability,
however, a conspiracy is unnecessary. Id. Furthermore, unlike Pinkerton, mere association with
a crime is not enough; rather, one must intentionally commit an affirmative act for the purpose of
furthering the substantive offense to be convicted as an aider or abettor. Id. at 970.
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vidual of substantive offenses he did not directly commit.33
Since Pinkerton and Nye & Nissen, federal courts have routinely
used coconspirator liability to convict defendants of a variety of substantive
offenses. 34 Within the past twenty years, however, circuits have split over
a fundamental issue underlying the applicability of the Pinkerton doctrine:
whether or not the original indictment must include a charge of conspiracy
itself.35 The Ninth Circuit has expressly declined to allow a Pinkertonconviction in the absence of a conspiracy charge. 36 Others, however, have held
that conspiracy need not be charged in order for the Pinkerton doctrine to
apply. 37 Circuits supporting this principle allow juries to infer the existence
of an unlawful agreement
even if the indictment does not formally charge
38
conspiracy itself.
In United States v. Zackery, the Eighth Circuit considered whether

a defendant could be convicted of using a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime under a Pinkerton theory of liability if conspiracy was not

33 Nye & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 620; see also United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 878 (11 th
Cir. 1985) (reiterating Pinkerton and aiding and abetting as alternative theories available to prove
one committed substantive offenses). The Meester court stated, "[a] defendant charged with conspiracy and the substantive offense 'normally will be responsible for the substantive crime under
the Pinkerton theory and also may be responsible for the substantive crime under an aiding and
abetting theory."' Id. (quoting United States v. Monaco, 702 F.2d 860, 881 (11th Cir. 1983));
see also Brenner, supra note 25, at 972 (explaining Pinkerton liability and accomplice liability as
"merely different ways of finding that an individual committed certain substantive offenses.")
(internal quotations omitted).
34 See, e.g., United States v. Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1335 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding defendant guilty of money laundering); United States v. Boyd, 222 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding
defendant guilty of mail and wire fraud); United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 324 (lst
Cir. 1995) (finding defendant guilty of assault on federal agent); Paul Silvio Berra, Jr., Comment,
Co-Conspirator Liability Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(Q): Is It Possible to Escape?, 1996 WIS. L. REV.
603, 606 (1996) (analyzing prevalence of Pinkerton liability in firearm cases); Manning, supra
note 1, at 97-102 (analyzing Pinkerton liability as most regularly applied to drug and firearm
crimes).
35 See United States v. Zackery, 494 F.3d 644, 647 (2007) (explaining circuit split).
36 See United States v. Nakai, 413 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) (ruling "[i]t is error to use
a Pinkerton instruction in a case in which the indictment does not allege a conspiracy."). The Nakai court reasoned that unlike an aiding and abetting charge, a conspiracy charge is not implicit in
any indictment; thus, the sanctioning of a Pinkerton instruction would essentially hold the defendant liable for the consequences of a crime with which he had not been charged. Id.
37 See United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) ("We have little difficulty
following our sister circuit courts of appeals in determining that a conspiracy need not be charged
in order for Pinkerton'sdoctrine to apply."); United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823, 827 (7th Cir.
1994) ("[T]he absence of a conspiracy charge does not preclude the district court from applying a
Pinkerton theory... ").
38 See Lopez, 271 F.3d at 480 ("It is not required that a conspiracy be charged in the indictment ... as long as the evidence at trial establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy
existed... "); Chairez, 33 F.3d at 827 ("[T]he absence of a conspiracy charge does not preclude
the district court from applying a Pinkerton theory... if the evidence so suggests.").
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charged in the indictment.39 In deciding the issue, the court first turned to
the underlying tenets of Pinkerton itself, insisting that the Pinkerton decision rested upon evidentiary principles of joint criminal liability and not on
whether a conspiracy itself was charged. 40 Having construed Pinkerton in
this fashion, the Eighth Circuit then turned to its precedent decision, United
States v. Thirion.4 1 While the defendant in Thirion could not be convicted
of a conspiracy offense due to the terms of a foreign country's extradition
treaty, the Eighth Circuit nevertheless upheld the defendant's conviction of
the substantive offenses under a Pinkerton theory of liability by directly
equating coconspirator liability with aiding and abetting liability. 42 According to the court, a defendant could be convicted under a theory of aiding and abetting even though it was not charged in the indictment, as aiding
and abetting did not create a separate offense but simply made those who
aided and abetted punishable as principals. 43 The Eighth Circuit found this
39 494 F.3d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 2007), petition fbr cert. filed, (U.S. Dec. 04, 2007) (No. 078034) (outlining Zackery's primary argument on appeal). The court acknowledged that this was a
matter of first impression for the Eighth Circuit; however, it also noted that in all of its previous
decisions affirming Pinkerton convictions, the underlying indictments did in fact charge a separate conspiracy offense. Id. at 647 (citing, e.g., United States v. Hayes, 391 F.3d 958, 963 (8th
Cir. 2004) (upholding Pinkertonjury instruction in light of conspiracy charge against defendant)).
40 Id. at 647 (stating, "[i]n our view, the narrow question before us is all but answered by the
Supreme Court's opinions in Pinkerton."). In support of its argument that Pinkerton was based
upon evidentiary principles of joint criminal liability rather than whether a conspiracy offense
was pleaded, the court referenced another Eighth Circuit opinion cited in the Pinkerton decision,
Baker v. United States. I. at 648 (citing Baker v. United States, 115 F.2d 533, 540 (8th Cir.
1940)). In Baker, the Eighth Circuit, upholding a defendant's conviction for fraud, stated, "[t]he
evidence conclusively shows that [the defendant] was a party to the scheme and even though a
conspiracy is not charged, yet when such a scheme is clearly participated in by more than one
individual, it constitutes in and of itself a conspiracy." Baker, 115 F.2d at 540. Thus, according
to the Eighth Circuit, Pinkerton liability turns solely on whether sufficient evidence exists to convict a defendant of additional substantive offenses; whether the indictment charged a separate
conspiracy offense is "simply irrelevant" to the analysis. Zackery, 494 F.3d at 648.
41 494 F.3d at 648 (citing United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987)). In Thirion,
the defendants were charged with mail fraud, inducing interstate travel to defraud, wire fraud, and
conspiracy. 813 F.2d at 149. However, one of the defendants fled to Monaco before the indictment was issued. Id. at 150. Monaco and the United States thereafter entered into an extradition
treaty and Monaco agreed to extradite the defendant on all charges against him except on the conspiracy count. Id. The Eighth Circuit, noting that the defendant technically could not be convicted of conspiracy, nevertheless concluded that the jury could hear a Pinkerton instruction and
convict the defendant of the substantive offenses under a theory of coconspirator liability. Id. at
151-52.
" 494 F.3d at 648 (quoting Thirion, 813 F. 2d at 151) (finding justifications for implied aiding and abetting theory in every indictment "equally applicable to co-conspirator liability.").
43 Id. The court did note, however, that Congress has recognized conspiracy to be a separate
statutory crime but has not done so with aiding and abetting. Id. The court dismissed this point,
stating that coconspirator liability did not have its origins in the federal conspiracy statute but
rather in the common law. Id. Pinkerton liability, therefore, like aiding and abetting liability, did
not create a separate offense but merely provided an alternative theory by which the government
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reasoning "equally applicable to coconspirator liability," and therefore held
that a defendant could be convicted under a coconspirator theory of liability
even if conspiracy was not charged in the indictment.44
The dissenting opinion, however, disagreed with the majority's application of the Pinkerton doctrine where the defendant had not been found
guilty of a separately charged conspiracy. 45 While acknowledging that the
Eighth Circuit had never squarely addressed the specific issue, the dissent
noted that all of the circuit's previous cases affirming Pinkerton convictions contained a separate charge of conspiracy in the indictments.4 6 Additionally, the dissent challenged the majority's reliance on Thirion as misplaced and argued that Thirion only stood for the proposition that the
Pinkerton theory of liability, like the aiding and abetting theory, did not
need to be charged in the indictment. 47 According to the dissent, Thirion
could prove joint criminal liability for substantive offenses. Id. at 649.
44 Id. at 648 (quoting Thirion, 813 F.2d at 151). The court also noted that its conclusion was
consistent with the general rule that evidence may be admitted under the coconspirator exception
to the hearsay rule "even in the absence of a conspiracy charge so long as there is independent
evidence of concert of action." Id. (quoting United States v. Richardson, 477 F.2d 1280, 1283
(8th Cir. 1973)).
" See 494 F.3d at 650 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (arguing Pinkerton doctrine inapplicable).
46 Id. at 650 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Pierce, 479 F.3d 546, 549-50
(8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Mathison, 157 F.3d 541, 551 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Davis, 154 F.3d 772, 782 (8th Cir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds); United States v.
Comeaux, 955 F.2d 586, 591 (8th Cir. 1992), United States v. Lucas, 932 F.2d 1210, 1220 (8th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Johnson, 906 F.2d 1285, 1289 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Golter, 880 F.2d 91, 92 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Lombardo, 859 F.2d 1328, 1329 (8th
Cir. 1988); United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 918 (8th Cir. 1985) (overruled on other
grounds)). Additionally, Justice Shepherd referenced two Eighth Circuit opinions and argued that
they stood for the proposition that absent a conspiracy charge, the Pinkerton doctrine is inapplicable. Zackery, 494 F.3d at 650 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Hayes, 391
F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2004) ("In light of the conspiracy charge against Hayes, the District Court
was warranted in giving [a Pinkerton coconspirator] instruction .... "); United States v. Richmond, 700 F.2d 1183, 1191 (8th Cir. 1983) ("In accordance with well established conspiracy law,
the trial court instructed the jury that if they found a defendant guilty of conspiracy they could
also find that defendant guilty of a substantive crime which was committed by his coconspirators
pursuant to the conspiracy at the time the defendant was a member of the conspiracy.").
47 See Zackerv, 494 F.3d at 652-53 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) ("While I agree that aiding and
abetting liability is an alternative theory in every indictment, coconspirator liability under
Pinkerton is not."). According to Justice Shepherd, Thirion stood for the proposition that the
government's theory of liability need not be charged in the original indictment; it did not hold
that conspiracy itself need not be charged. Id. at 652 (emphasis added). Thus, Thirion's analogy
to aiding and abetting only applied to whether the theory of liability had to be stated in original
indictment, and not to the issue of conspiracy itself. Id. (emphasis added). Justice Shepherd also
criticized the majority's reliance on two other circuit cases affirming Pinkerton convictions absent an underlying charge of conspiracy. Id. at 651. He pointed out that the Seventh Circuit
opinion, United States v. Chairez, 33 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 1994), relied solely upon United States v.
Macey, 8 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 1993), a case involving a conviction of mail fraud. Zacker,, 494
F.3d at 651 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). In doing so, Justice Shepherd argued, "[b]ecause mail
fraud includes a scheme to defraud as an element, it is not surprising that members of the scheme
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actually supported the notion that conspiracy must be charged before
Pinkerton liability may be imposed, and merely indicated that the
Pinkerton theory itself need not be charged in the original indictment. 48
Finally, the dissent criticized the majority opinion for disregarding the
principles articulated in Pinkerton and Nye & Nissen, and argued that the
majority "broaden[ed] the scope of the theory beyond that contemplated by
the Supreme Court., 49 In light of these principles, the dissent concluded
that the defendant's conviction should be reversed, as his guilt "could not
be premised upon his being found guilty of an uncharged conspiracy."5
In United States v. Zackery, the Eighth Circuit incorrectly applied
the Pinkertontheory of liability absent an underlying charge and conviction
of conspiracy. 51 The Pinkerton doctrine created coconspirator vicarious liability; therefore, as conspiracy is a distinct and separate offense, it follows
that a specific finding of guilt on the conspiracy charge precedes any conviction under the vicarious liability standard.52 Indeed, the very reasoning
underlying the Pinkerton opinion reflected the Court's concern with the

dangerous nature of the conspiracy offense itself.53 As the Supreme Court

are criminally liable for the foreseeable mail fraud committed by other members." Id. Thus, according to Justice Shepherd, cases that involve convictions of mail fraud are distinguishable, as
they implicitly charge conspiracy by delegating one element of the offense to include a scheme to
defraud. Id.
48 494 F.3d at 652 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (clarifying holding of Thirion). In Thirion, the
Eighth Circuit upheld the district court's vicarious coconspirator jury instruction, which specifically stated that the jury must find the defendant was a coconspirator "as charged" in the indictment in order to find the defendant guilty under the Pinkerton theory. Id. (citing United States v.
Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 152 n.6 (8th Cir. 1987)). According to Justice Shepherd, Thirion actually
supported the proposition that a conspiracy must first be charged before a Pinkerton instruction
could take place. 494 F.3d at 652.
49 494 F.3d at 652 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). Justice Shepherd pointed out that the Nye &
Nissen Court specifically interpreted Pinkerton liability as "narrow in its scope," and argued that
its application is only available under narrow circumstances. Id. (citing Nye & Nissen v. United
States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949)).
50 Id. at 653 (Shepherd, J., dissenting). Justice Shepherd pointed out that the government
chose, "unsuccessfully, to prove that Zackery aided and abetted" in the possession of a firearm,
rather than to charge him with conspiracy to commit bank robbery. Id. Thus, according to Justice Shepherd, the government should be precluded from invoking a Pinkerton theory of liability,
because the indictment "provided no notice that [the defendant's] guilt could be premised upon
his being found guilty of an uncharged conspiracy." Id.
51 See id. at 648 (holding "whether the indictment charged a separate conspiracy offense is
simply irrelevant.").
52 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 2 1,at 6 ("As Mr. Zackery was not charged
with conspiracy, he may not be convicted upon a theory of conspiracy.").
53 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 n.3 (1946) (recognizing gravity of conspiracy offense). According to the Court:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws is an offense of the gravest character, sometimes
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indicated in Nve & Nissen, Pinkerton is "narrow in its scope," and will only
apply if a conspiracy exists and if there is a reasonable connection between
the goals of that conspiracy and the substantive offenses committed. 54 By
upholding a conviction under a Pinkerton theory of liability absent an underlying charge of conspiracy, the Eighth Circuit erroneously broadened
55
the doctrine's application beyond that envisioned by the Supreme Court.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit improperly relied on its prior decision, United States v. Thirion, as Thirion itself runs afoul to the principles
articulated in Nve & Nissen.56 In Thirion, the court directly analogized coconspirator liability with aiding and abetting liability and found that because an aiding and abetting theory of liability may be implicit in any indictment, a Pinkerton coconspirator theory of liability may be implicit as
well. 7 By doing so, the Thirion court ignored the fundamental differences
between aiding and abetting and coconspirator liability as articulated by the
Supreme Court. 58 In Nye & Nissen, the Court expressly stated that aiding
quite outweighing, in injury to the public, the mere commission of the contemplated
crime. It involves deliberate plotting to subvert laws, educating and preparing the conspirators for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by secrecy,
rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its discovery, and adding to
the importance of punishing it when discovered.
Id. (citing United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915)). The Court therefore recognized
that the dangers of conspiracy are not confined simply to the substantive crimes committed in
furtherance of the agreement, but extend to the very act of forming the agreement itself. Id. In
light of these concerns, the Pinkerton Court may have articulated its rule with the hope of deterring future conspiracy involvement. See Noferi, supra note 24, at 102-03 (articulating ways
Pinkerton liability may deter criminal conspiracy). According to Noferi, the Pinkerton doctrine
may cause would-be criminals to second guess their involvement before joining a conspiracy and
encourage conspirators to cooperate with the government in the hope of evading extensive criminal liability for the substantive crimes of their associates. Id.
54 See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 620 (1949) ("The rule of [Pinkerton]
does service where the conspiracy was one to commit offenses of the character described in the
substantive accounts."). In contrast, aiding and abetting makes a defendant liable as a principle
when he knowingly assists in a criminal act "whether or not there is a conspiracy." Id.
55 See 494 F.3d at 653 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) ("As instructed by the Supreme Court,
[Pinkerton] is available under narrow circumstances.").
According to Justice Shepherd,
Pinkerton's application, absent the essential conspiracy conviction, ran contrary to the original
intentions of the Pinkerton and Nye & Nissen Courts. Id. at 652.
56 See id at 648 (quoting reasoning in Thirion); see also supra text accompanying notes 3033 (setting forth main principles of Nye & Nissen).
57 See United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146, 152 (8th Cir. 1987) (stating rationale behind
aiding and abetting "equally applicable to coconspirator liability."). In drawing this conclusion,
the court cited Pinkerton's assertion that coconspirator liability is founded on the same principle
as one who aids and abets the commission of a crime. Id. at 151. From this declaration, the
Thirion court concluded that "the individual substantive counts need not make reference to coconspirator liability in order for the jury to be so instructed." Id. at 152.
5s See Ntve & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 620 (1949) (distinguishing Pinkerton's "narrow" scope
from aiding and abetting's "broader base.").
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and abetting "rests on a broader base" than coconspirator liability; specifically, the Court maintained that an aiding and abetting instruction may be
submitted to a jury regardless of whether or not a conspiracy existed, but
that a Pinkerton instruction would only stand in light of a conspiracy
charge.59 Thus, the Nye & Nissen Court rejected the contention that a conspiracy charge is implicit in any indictment as an alternative to aiding and
abetting.60
In upholding a Pinkerton conviction absent an underlying charge
and conviction of conspiracy, the Eighth Circuit has dangerously expanded
the scope of prosecutorial discretion at the expense of defendants' rights to
due process. 6 The original Pinkerton decision increased the likelihood for
conspiracy prosecutions, as the government need only prove the existence
of a conspiracy to secure convictions on other substantive charges.62 The
59 Id,see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (highlighting major differences between
aiding and abetting liability and coconspirator liability).
"0 See 336 U.S. at 618 (finding requirements for verdict under Pinkerton theory not met).

According to the Nye & Nissen Court, a conviction under a Pinkerton theory of liability requires
proof that the defendant joined a conspiracy and that the substantive offenses committed were in
furtherance of the conspiracy and were part of it. Id. The Court acknowledged that these requirements were not met and therefore a conviction under Pinkerton was not warranted. Id.
However, the Court reasoned that the case was submitted on an "equally valid theory" of aiding
and abetting. Id. Thus, the Court refused to imply a Pinkerton theory of liability in the indictment but acknowledged the implicit charge of aiding and abetting. Idat 618-19.
61 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 648-54 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (arguing Pinkerton sets dangerous precedent). Justice Rutledge's dissent in the original Pinkerton
opinion called attention to the potential dangers of abuse involved in conspiracy law and criticized the wide latitude the new precedent would afford to prosecutors. Id at 650. Specifically,
he feared the "looseness with which the [conspiracy] charge may be proved, [and] the almost
unlimited scope of vicarious responsibility for others' acts which follow once an agreement is
shown ...." Id. Justice Rutledge reiterated that it is the duty of the Court to exercise "supervisory power" over the methods of federal criminal prosecutions and to prevent prosecutorial discretion from expanding "into new, wider, and more dubious areas of choice." Id; see also Noferi,
supra note 24, at 147 (arguing for additional due process limitations on Pinkerton vicarious liability).
62 See Pauley, supra note 28, at 6 (explaining "vituperative criticism" sparked by Pinkerton
decision). As the President of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers stated,
[T]he Pinkerton doctrine permits the government to hold a defendant criminally responsible for all reasonably foreseeable acts of co-conspirators regardless of actual
knowledge, intent, or participation. Thus, if the government cannot prove a defendant
guilty on various substantive charges, it need only convince a jury of the defendant's
guilt of conspiracy to secure convictions on the otherwise unsupportable substantive
charges.
Id. (citing Letter from Jeff Weiner, President, Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers (Feb. 1991));
see also Nve & Nissen, 336 U.S. at 626 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (noting increased tendency
for prosecutors to indict for conspiracy). Justice Frankfurter worried about the possible abuse of
defendants' rights in light of the Pinkerton doctrine and cautioned, "[T]he concept of conspiracy
is not an invitation to circumvent the safeguards in the prosecution of crime ...." Id.
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Eighth Circuit's holding only broadened this discretion, as it essentially
eliminated the government's burden to properly charge the defendant and
left the defendant to guess as to the charges against him.6 3 Further, by finding that a Pinkerton theory may be implicit in any indictment, the Eighth
Circuit lessened the government's burden of proof from an aiding and abetting theory-which requires proof that the defendant knowingly aided in
the commission of the offense-to a Pinkerton theory, which only requires
proof that the offense was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant and
committed in furtherance of the conspiracy.6 4 Doing so unjustly prejudices
a defendant and makes him liable for the consequences of a crime for
which he has not been charged.65
In United States v. Zackerv, the Eighth Circuit considered whether
a defendant could be convicted of a substantive offense under the Pinkerton
theory of liability if the indictment did not include a charge of conspiracy
itself. In upholding a Pinkerton conviction absent an underlying charge
and conviction of conspiracy, the court erroneously broadened the doc63 See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, sopra note 21, at 6 ("The 'inference' of a conspiracy is
not enough to supply the required Constitutional notice to the defendant."). Zackery argued that
an indictment absent a conspiracy charge "did not minimally inform him that he could be convicted under a conspiracy liability theory." 494 F.3d at 649. The court disagreed, finding the
allegation that Zackery violated the firearm statute when he and another man brandished a gun in
furtherance of the robbery "was enough to alert the defense to the prospect of a Pinkerton theory." Id. (quoting United States v. Edmond, 924 F.2d 261, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The court further stated, "[a]n indictment need not plead the government's theory of liability." Id. But see id.
at 652 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (agreeing theory of liability need not be charged in indictment
but arguing foundation for theory must be).
64 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1946) (reiterating scope of
Pinkerton doctrine). A Pinkerton conviction simply requires that a coconspirator commit a substantive offense in furtherance of the conspiracy, that the offense is within the scope of the conspiracy, and that it is reasonably foreseeable as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. Id. A
conviction under the federal aiding and abetting statute, however, requires that a defendant "willfully caus[e] an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense
against the United States... " 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000). Thus, in securing a conviction for firearm possession under a Pinkerton theory of liability, the government would only have to prove
that the actions of Zackery's partner were reasonably foreseeable to him, rather than prove that
Zackery willfully and intentionally assisted his partner in the commission of the crime. See Brief
of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 21, at 6 ("The crucial and fundamental difference . . . [between aiding and abetting and conspiracy] is to change the mental element from 'knowing' to
'reasonably foreseeable' and eliminate the required showing of 'intent."').
65 United States v. Nakai, 413 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding it is error to use
Pinkerton instruction when indictment does not allege conspiracy); see also Zacke,, 494 F.3d at
653 (Shepherd, J., dissenting) (arguing government cannot proceed under Pinkerton theory absent
charge of conspiracy). Justice Shepherd pointed out that the government chose, unsuccessfully,
to prove that Zackery aided and abetted in the possession of a firearm rather than to charge him
with conspiracy to commit bank robbery. Id. Thus, according to Justice Shepherd, the government is precluded from invoking a Pinkerton theory of liability, as the indictment "provided no
notice that [the defendant's] guilt could be premised upon his being found guilty of an uncharged
conspiracy." Id.
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trine's application beyond that envisioned by the Supreme Court in
Pinkerton and Nye & Nissen. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit substantially
increased the scope of prosecutorial discretion and the likelihood for abuse
at the expense of defendants' rights to due process.
Christi Gannon

